Systems Competition (PhD + AMC)

[ Course | Course Outline | Core Reference | Notes]




 

 

 

Course Structure

 

I. Introduction

1. Globalization: stylized facts

2. Implications for public policy

3. Outline of the course

References: (* compulsory reading)

*Devereux, M.P., R. Griffith, and A. Klemm, 2002: “Corporate Income Tax Reforms and International Tax Competition.” Economic Policy, October, 451-495.

*OECD Economic Outlook 2003, Paris. Chapter 6 [pdf], chapter  7 [pdf], and chapter 8 [pdf]

*Sinn, H.W., 2003: The New Systems Competition, Yrjö-Jahnsson Lectures, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Chapter 1.

 

II. Tax competition

1. “Race to the bottom view”

a. Fiscal competition à la Zodrow-Mieszkowski

b. Fiscal competition and economic geography

c. Fiscal competition in federations: Does it make a difference?

References: (* compulsory reading)

Baldwin, R.E. and P. Krugman, 2004: “Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation,” European Economic Review 48, 1-23.

Bucovetsky, S.  and M. Smart, 2002: “The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions.” CESifo Working Paper No. 767, Munich; forthcoming in: Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Büttner, T. 2005: “The Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization Transfers on Tax Policy.” CESifo WP No. 1404, Munich.

*Haufler, A. and I. Wooton, 1999: “Country Size and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment.” Journal of Public Economics 71, 121-139

*Köthenbürger, M., 2002: “Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization.” International Tax and Public Finance 9, 391-408.

Kind, H.J., K.H. Midelfart Knarvik and G. Schjelderup 2000, “Competing for Capital in a Lumpy World.”  Journal of Public Economics 78, 253-274.

*Sinn, H.W., 2003: The New Systems Competition, Yrjö-Jahnsson Lectures, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Chapter 2.

*Zodrow, G.R. and P. Mieszkowski, 1986: “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics 19, 356-370.

 

2. Fiscal competition in a second-best world: Safeguard against fiscal expropriation?

a. Leviathan governments

b. Political agency problems

c. Commitment issues

References: (* compulsory reading)

*Besley, T. and M. Smart, 2003: “Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare”, mimeo, LSE.

 Brennan, G. and J. Buchanan, 1980: The Power To Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

*Edwards, J. and M. Keen, 1996: “Tax competition and Leviathan.” European Economic Review, 40, 113-134.

*Janeba, E., 2000: “Tax Competition when Governments Lack Commitment: Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat.” American Economic Review 90, 1508-1519.

Köthenbürger, M., 2005: “Leviathans, Federal Transfers, and the Cartelization Hypothesis.” Public Choice 122, 449-465

 

III. Globalization and the Welfare State

1. Why income redistribution?

2. Impact of globalization on the welfare state: Migration and more!

3. Policy Implications!

References: (* compulsory reading)

 Rodrik, D., 1998: “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy 106, 997-1032.

*Richter, W., 2004: “Delaying Integration of Immigrant Labor for the Purpose of Taxation.” Journal of Urban Economics 55, 597-613.

*Sinn, H.W., 2003: The New Systems Competition, Yrjö-Jahnsson Lectures, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Chapter 3.

*Wildasin, D.E., 2000: “Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition.” American Economic Review 90, 73–95.

 

More information on the second half of the course will be provided by Mika in due course!

 

 


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